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In the opening brief ("OB") Mr. Bowden makes three arguments: (I) the 
evidence was insufficient to support the attempted aggravated murder and 
obstruction of justice charges because it failed to prove identity, (II) the trial 
court erred by admitting evidence that Mr. Bowden had an unfired cartridge in 
his pocket when arrested because that evidence violated rules 401, 402, and 403 
of the rules of evidence, and (III) the trial court erred by refusing to merge the 
discharge of a firearm convictions with the attempted aggravated murder 
conviction.  
In the response brief ("SB"), the State responds to the first argument as 
follows: (1) sufficient evidence supported the attempted aggravated murder and 
obstruction of justice convictions, and (2) Mr. Bowden did not preserve his claim 
on appeal that insufficient evidence supported the obstructing justice count. 
Regarding the second argument, the State responds that the unfired cartridge 
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evidence was admissible as intrinsic evidence. Finally, regarding the third 
argument, the State responds that the trial court correctly denied the merger 
request because the aggravated murder statute prohibits merger.  
This reply brief first provides a clarification of the record facts. It then 
makes the following points: (I)(A) insufficient evidence supported Mr. Bowden's 
conviction for attempted aggravated murder; (I)(B) insufficient evidence 
supported Mr. Bowden's conviction for obstruction of justice; (I)(C) Mr. Bowden 
preserved his claim that insufficient evidence supported the obstructing justice 
charge; (II) it was error to admit evidence of the bullet in Mr. Bowden's pocket 
because that evidence was irrelevant under rules 401 and 402 and unfairly 
prejudicial under rule 403; and (III) merger was available and appropriate for 
Mr. Bowden's convictions of firearm discharge.  
This reply is "limited to responding to the facts and arguments raised in the 
appellee's . . . brief." Utah R. App. P. 24(b). Matters not addressed were either 
adequately addressed in the opening brief or do not merit reply.  
CLARIFICATION OF FACTS 
The State alleges that Mr. Bowden "stole a truck and 'six or seven' guns 
from the truck owner's house." SB 5. The State repeats this claim: "[t]he jurors 
heard testimony that Defendant stole guns and ammunition from the truck 
owner's home . . . ." SB 33. The State refers to "the truck Defendant stole . . . ." SB 
31. But, there was no testimony that Mr. Bowden stole the truck or anything from 
the truck owner's home and the State never charged Mr. Bowden with theft or 
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burglary. R.0001-0005,1119-1130. Thus this Court should disregard these 
incorrect assertions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should reverse and remand with an order to dismiss 
the attempted aggravated murder and obstruction of justice 
convictions because there was insufficient evidence to prove 
identity. 
 
Evidence presented by the State did not support a reasonable inference 
that Mr. Bowden is the person who shot at Tsouras or the person who hid the gun 
after the shooting. Mr. Bowden addresses the following points: (A) the State 
presented insufficient evidence to support Mr. Bowden's conviction for attempted 
aggravated murder, (B) the State presented insufficient evidence to support Mr. 
Bowden's conviction for obstruction of justice, and (C) Mr. Bowden preserved his 
argument that insufficient evidence supported the obstruction of justice charge.  
A. The State presented insufficient evidence to support the attempted 
aggravated murder conviction. 
 
The State argues "that a person dressed the same or similarly to [Mr. 
Bowden] was the only person running from the police and shot in Tsouras's 
direction." See SB 19. But this Court should reverse because the evidence 
supports only the speculative possibility that the witnesses all described the same 
person or that they had described Mr. Bowden.  
"When evidence supports only one possible conclusion, the quality of the 
inference rests on the 'reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the 
proven facts.'" State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶ 16, 238 P.3d 1096 (quoting 
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Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
Where, as here, the evidence supports more than one equally likely conclusion, 
"the choice of one possibility over another can be no more than speculation." See 
id. The State notes that "'circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to 
establish the guilt of the accused."' See SB 19. Still, circumstantial evidence must 
support "reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence." Salt Lake City v. 
Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶11, 358 P.3d 1067; see also State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT 
App 48, ¶ 57, 397 P.3d 626; State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (Utah 1978). 
"Of course, it does not follow that a court is free to arrest judgment simply 
because it disagrees with the inferences a jury draws." State v. Workman, 852 
P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993). "But when the inference of guilt does not logically 
flow from the evidence, it is incumbent on a reviewing court to set the verdict 
aside." Id.  As in Carrera, Mr. Bowden's appeal depends on "the difference 
between an inference and speculation . . . ." See Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶ 12. In the 
instant case, the evidence was insufficient because amounted to speculation. 
Unlike in State v. Howell (see SB 18,22), Mr. Bowden does not argue that 
the jury "was obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to defendant." 649 
P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).  In Howell, in which a jury convicted the defendant of 
manslaughter and attempted manslaughter, the defendant "recite[d] a version of 
the facts which, if believed, would support a defense of self-defense to the murder 
charges," but that the jury did not believe. Id. at 93. Our supreme court upheld 
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the verdict, reasoning that the Howell defendant's reciting evidence that 
contradicted the verdict did not render the verdict invalid. Id. at 97.  
In contrast to Howell, Mr. Bowden argues that the State failed to present 
evidence supporting reasonable inferences identifying him as the shooter. In 
other words, Mr. Bowden argues that the State presented only the speculative 
possibility of his guilt, among other equally strong inferences. See Cristobal, 2010 
UT App 228, ¶ 16; OB 22-27. 
Mr. Bowden's argument that insufficient evidence supports his conviction 
for attempted aggravated murder does not merely point out inconsistencies in 
witness testimony, as the State argues. See SB 24. Instead, Mr. Bowden argues 
that the evidence did not support one inferred conclusion. See Cristobal, 2010 UT 
App 228, ¶ 16; OB 22-27. Contrary to the State's assertion that "Defendant was 
the only person in the area running and the only person in the containment area 
that matched the shooter's description," the video and other evidence described 
other men in the containment area who matched the shooter's description. See 
SB 23-24; OB 22-27. For example, although Tsouras had the best opportunity to 
view the shooter during the shooting, he identified a different but similarly 
dressed man as the shooter. See OB 25; R.806-10,830. Contrary to the State's 
assertion that "[m]ultiple witnesses described and video recordings captured a 
single person," the Mousepad Video depicts similarly dressed men in the area. 
See SB 20; R.1178-79; State's Ex. 12,191. Tsouras agreed that the shooter could 
have been someone other than Mr. Bowden and agreed that cars and businesses 
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were nearby. OB 9, R.823-24. Officer Clark had also expressed concerns about 
other possible fugitives at the nearby Mouse Pad. OB 5-6. Moreover, the Family 
Dollar store manager, the taco line bystander, and Officers Clark, Franchow, 
Lechuga, Walser, and Stilson, had no opportunity to view the shooter during the 
event and therefore did not testify as to whether there was one man or others in 
the immediate shooting area. See SB 20-23; OB 7-10; R.841-889,897-915,932-
954,964-1006,1190-1203. 
While the State argues that Mr. Bowden's flight from police is evidence of 
his involvement in the shooting, Mr. Bowden's running gives rise only to 
speculation. See SB 23-24; OB 18-19; Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶¶ 14,17; see 
also Salt Lake City v. Gallegos, 2015 UT App 78, ¶¶ 7-10, 347 P.3d 842 (holding 
that defendant's flight, scrapes, and clothing, in area of reported scuffle provided 
insufficient evidence that defendant fled to avoid arrest). The State also argues 
that Mr. Bowden "offered no innocent explanation for running from police or for 
the injuries to his hand." SB 24. Mr. Bowden's conceded connection to the stolen 
truck explains his running. See OB 6,26-27. His climbing over a fence, as Officers 
Franchow and Lechuga observed, explains injuries to his hands. See OB 10. While 
the State, as it argues, may present "a mosaic of circumstantial evidence," the 
State must still present non-speculative evidence for every element. See, 
MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶ 57; Carrera, 2015 UT73, ¶¶ 10-22; SB 24-25. Here, 
the State presented only speculative possibilities identifying Mr. Bowden as 
Tsouras's shooter. See OB 13-27.  
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B. The State presented insufficient evidence to support Mr. Bowden's 
conviction for obstruction of justice. 
 
The State argues that because Mr. Bowden's insufficiency argument is 
unpreserved, Mr. Bowden must demonstrate that "the 'insufficiency was so 
obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the 
jury'" and that Mr. Bowden cannot meet this burden. SB 26-27, (quoting State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 17, 10 P.3d 346). As argued infra, Point I.C., Mr. Bowden 
preserved this issue. Alternatively, as argued in the opening brief, the 
"insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury." See id.; OB 13-28,30. There was insufficient 
evidence identifying Mr. Bowden as the shooter; a fortiori, insufficient evidence 
identifies him as the person who obstructed justice by hiding the gun. 
C. Mr. Bowden preserved his argument that insufficient evidence 
supported the obstruction of justice charge. 
 
When the trial court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to send the 
attempted aggravated murder charge to the jury, it also ruled that there was 
sufficient evidence to send the obstruction of justice charge to the jury. See OB 
28; R.1226.  
Parties preserve an issue when they raise and argue the issue "in such a 
way that the [trial] court has an opportunity to rule on [it]." State v. Johnson, 
2017 UT 76, ¶ 18, 416 P.3d 443 (quoting Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 12, 
266 P.3d 828); see also SB 25. The person who fired the shots was also the 
person who discarded the gun. If there was insufficient evidence to prove that Mr. 
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Bowden was the shooter, there was necessarily insufficient evidence that Mr. 
Bowden was the person to discard the gun. See OB 28.  
Even if an issue is raised "indirectly," it is preserved if it is "raised to a level 
of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." State v. Brown, 856 
P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a claim 
is preserved for appeal if the trial court considers and rules on the claim. State v. 
Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1052-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also United States 
v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41-45 (1992) (holding that certiorari was appropriate 
where the issue presented was not "pressed" below but was "passed upon" 
because the lower court had "decided the substantive issue presented").  
In this case, Mr. Bowden's sufficiency of the evidence argument regarding 
the obstruction of justice charge is preserved. See SB 25. As required by Brown 
and Johnson, Mr. Bowden's motion for directed verdict concerning the identity of 
the person who shot the gun necessarily preserved the issue of the identity of the 
person who hid the gun by raising the issue "to a level of consciousness such that 
the trial court [could] consider it." See Brown, 856 P.2d at 361; Johnson, 2017 UT 
76, ¶ 18; R.1224-1226. The State referred to the obstruction of justice evidence in 
its argument against directed verdict. R.1225-26. The State argued "[h]e's seen on 
a dash cam video . . . firing at this officer and then going northbound, housing1 
his gun." R.1226. Moreover, the trial court considered and ruled on the directed 
                                                 
1 "[H]ousing" is probably a transcription error. The prosecutor probably said 
"losing," referring to "lose" as meaning- "to free oneself from." 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lose, last visited 5/31/18. 
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verdict motion "for each of the counts as charged." See R.1226; Matsamas, 808 
P.2d at 1052-53; Williams, 504 U.S. at 41-45. Thus, the issue was preserved. But, 
if this Court disagrees, it should reverse for plain error. See OB 30. 
II. This Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because 
admission of the evidence of the unfired bullet in Bowden's 
pocket was irrelevant and prejudicial.  
 
Mr. Bowden argues on appeal that the evidence of the unfired cartridge 
"should have been excluded under Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence." See OB 30. The State does not challenge Mr. Bowden's relevance 
argument except to claim that the unfired cartridge linked Mr. Bowden to the 
stolen truck and thus Mr. Bowden "was familiar with and had access to weapons." 
SB 31,33. Instead, the State argues that (1) the evidence is admissible because it is 
intrinsic; (2) rule 404(b) is an alternate ground for affirmance; (3) the evidence 
was not substantially more unfairly prejudicial than probative; and that (4) Mr. 
Bowden did not show that admitting the evidence of the bullet prejudiced Mr. 
Bowden. SB 28-34. The State's arguments fail. First, rules 401-403 do not 
consider intrinsic-ness— that is a 404(b) question. To the degree that "intrinsic" 
applies, the evidence was not intrinsic. Second, rule 404(b) is not an alternate 
ground for affirmance. Finally, without the bullet evidence there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Mr. Bowden.  
A. The evidence was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and not intrinsic. 
Rules 401-403 do not consider whether evidence is intrinsic or extrinsic. 
Intrinsic versus extrinsic are questions for 404(b) issues. To the extent that the 
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intrinsic or extrinsic nature of the evidence matters here, the evidence was not 
intrinsic.  
The State's argument, that the evidence was admissible as intrinsic 
evidence, fails because rules 401-403 are not concerned with the intrinsic nature 
of evidence. See SB 28-31. Instead rule 402 asks whether the evidence "has any 
tendency to make a fact" that is "of consequence in determining the action," any 
"more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Utah R. Evid. 402 
(attached at Addendum A); OB 31. Rule 401 allows admission for only relevant 
evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401 (attached at Addendum A); OB 31. Rule 403 provides 
for exclusion of relevant evidence where the probative nature is "substantially 
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403 (attached at 
Addendum A); OB 35-36.  
Rather, rule 404(b) considers whether evidence is intrinsic. Cases that the 
State cites concerning intrinsic evidence only discussed evidence contested under 
rule 404(b). See SB 29-31; United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (10th 
Cir. 2009); State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 14 n.7, 328 P.3d 841 (abrogated on 
other grounds, State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016); State v. Burke, 2011 
UT App 168, ¶ 65, 256 P.3d 1102; United States v. McKinley, 647 Fed.Appx. 957, 
962 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1212 (10th Cir. 2011). 
Moreover, while this Court mentioned "intrinsic" evidence in Burke, this Court 
did not determine whether the evidence disputed in Burke was intrinsic or 
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whether rule 404(b) should apply to intrinsic evidence because that defendant 
did not brief that issue. See Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ¶ 66. 
To the degree that it matters here whether the evidence of the unfired 
bullet was intrinsic, it was not intrinsic. While evidence that is relevant may be 
considered "intrinsic," labeling evidence "intrinsic" does not make it relevant. For 
example, in Parker, the uncharged "intrinsic" other acts were relevant because 
they provided direct evidence of the defendant's participation in the charged 
crimes. See Parker, 553 F.3d at 1314. Similarly, in Irving, the Tenth Circuit 
considered evidence intrinsic where the evidence explained the defendant's 
motives. See Irving, 665 F.3d at 1212-14. Likewise, in McKinley, the evidence 
explained "the context, motive, and set-up of the crime." See McKinley, 647 
Fed.Appx. at 963. Evidence of the defendant's attacking someone with a brick 
was relevant to explain the victim's testimony regarding the defendant's coercion 
and use of force. Id. The federal courts in these cases considered the evidence 
intrinsic because it was relevant. 
Utah courts have not found otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible as 
"intrinsic." For example, in State v. High, a case involving aggravated assault, the 
State argued that evidence of the defendant's prior fights with rival gangs was 
"intrinsic" to the crime charged and "inextricably intertwined" with the charged 
assault. High, 2012 UT App 180, ¶¶ 1, 7,10-12,15,20-22. This Court rejected that 
argument because there was no evidence that the victims were rival gang 
12 
 
members. Id. ¶¶ 22,48-49. Thus the evidence was not relevant as "intrinsic" or 
"intrinsically intertwined," and was less probative than prejudicial. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. 
Moreover, Utah courts have not considered evidence "intrinsic" to the 
State's narrative where the evidence is offered to prove an uncontested fact. If a 
defendant offers to stipulate to a fact, "the prosecution retains wide discretion to 
reject such an offer, which it might legitimately do, for example, to preserve the 
right to present evidence with broad 'narrative value' beyond the establishment 
particular elements of a crime." State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 28, 296 P.3d 673 
(abrogated on other grounds, Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶¶ 38-41). But if the 
prosecution lacks a legitimate explanation for refusing a defendant's offer to 
stipulate, such "rejection . . . reinforce[s] the conclusion that the prosecution's 
purpose was not to tell a legitimate narrative . . . but instead to present an 
improper one." Id. ¶ 30. "[A]n avowed proper purpose may be rejected as a 
pretext or 'ruse.'" Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 59. "That would be appropriate, for 
example, where the proper purpose put forward by the prosecution is addressed 
to an issue that is not actually disputed, and where the court concludes that the 
only real effect is to suggest likely action in conformity with bad character." Id. 
Here, evidence that Mr. Bowden carried the unfired Federal cartridge that 
would not have fit into the 9 mm Ruger which shot at Officer Tsouras was 
irrelevant and not intrinsic. Although the State argues that evidence of the bullet 
in Mr. Bowden's pocket was relevant to link Mr. Bowden to the stolen truck, Mr. 
Bowden conceded his connection to the stolen truck. SB 30-31; OB 38; see Verde, 
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2012 UT 60, ¶¶ 28-30; Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 59; R.780-81,957,1104-
06,1183,1311. Moreover, the State did not reject Mr. Bowden's offer to stipulate to 
the fact that he was in possession of the stolen truck but relied upon it as fact 
when arguing for admission of the evidence of the bullet in Mr. Bowden's pocket. 
See Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶¶ 28-30; R.956. Thus the similarity of the pocketed 
Federal cartridge to ammunition found in the stolen truck did not "address[] . . . 
an issue that [was] . . . actually disputed . . . ." See Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 59; SB 
30-31. Thus, it was not relevant.   
Nor was evidence of the pocketed bullet relevant for other purposes, as 
federal cases consider "intrinsic" evidence. See Parker, 553 F.3d at 1315; Irving, 
665 F.3d at 1212-14; McKinley 665 F.3d at 1188-91, 1210-14. Where the Federal 
cartridge could not have fit into the Ruger, evidence of the cartridge cannot be 
relevant to illustrate Mr. Bowden's participation in shooting the Ruger. See 
Parker, 553 F.3d at 1315. Although Mr. Bowden may have possessed the cartridge 
at the same time as the shooting took place, it was not the contemporaneous 
nature of events in Parker that made them "intrinsic," but their relevance in 
illustrating the defendant's participation in the charged crimes. See id. at 1312-
1315. Unlike in Irving, Mr. Bowden's possessing the Federal cartridge did not 
illustrate a "motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or 
accident . . ." connected to shooting at Tsouras. See Irving, 665 F.3d at 1212-14. 
Unlike in McKinley, evidence of the large bullet in Mr. Bowden's pocket did not 
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explain or provide context for Officer Tsouras's testimony. See McKinley, 647 
Fed.Appx. at 963.  
Evidence of the bullet in Mr. Bowden's pocket was irrelevant to any proper 
purpose. The State did not need the evidence to "link[] [Mr. Bowden] to the guns 
and ammunition in the truck," because Mr. Bowden never contested his 
connection to the truck. See SB 31; Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 59; Verde, 2012 UT 
60, ¶¶ 25-30; R.780-81,957,1104-06,1183,1311. Thus, "linking [Mr. Bowden] to 
the guns and ammunition in the truck" was not "of consequence in determining 
the action." See SB 31; Utah R. Evid. 401(b). Although the State argues that the 
Federal bullet, demonstrating Mr. Bowden's "access and familiarity" with 
ammunition, "is further proof [of] his identity as the shooter," the State is 
incorrect for two reasons. See SB 31. First, Mr. Bowden's access to the truck was 
never contested. Second, if, as the State argued in trial, possessing the Federal 
cartridge equates to "familiarity," comfort, or an interest in firearms, such is 
irrelevant proclivity evidence. See SB 31; State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ¶ 32, 
52 P.3d 1194; R.961-63. Moreover, the unfired Federal bullet does not 
demonstrate Mr. Bowden's familiarity with 9 mm bullets or make Mr. Bowden 
more likely to have shot the Ruger. See SB 31. Nor was the evidence intrinsic or 
relevant to any other purpose.  
Moreover, evidence of the unfired bullet was substantially more unfairly 
prejudicial than probative. See Utah R. Evid. 403; OB 35-39. The State argued 
that the Federal cartridge could not have been unfairly prejudicial because it was 
15 
 
"further evidence of [Mr. Bowden's] guilt." SB 32. The State argued that the bullet 
provided evidence of guilt by providing "further proof linking him to the truck 
where police found other ammunition that more directly tied [Mr. Bowden] to 
the shooting." SB 32. But, as argued in the opening brief and supra, Mr. 
Bowden's conceding his connection to the truck made his possession of the 
Federal cartridge less probative than prejudicial. See OB 35-39. Although the 
State cites State v. Magleby, that case does not apply here. See 241 F.3d 1306, 
1315; SB 32. In Magleby, victims' reactions to a racially-motivated cross-burning 
were probative of the defendant's intent. Id. at 1308, 1315-16. But, in the instant 
case, the evidence is irrelevant to any fact "of consequence in determining the 
action." See Utah R. Evid. 401(b); supra; OB 30-35. 
"A proper rule 403 analysis . . . requires a district court to look first, and 
primarily, to the language of rule 403." State v. Ring, 2018 UT 19, ¶ 23, __ P.3d 
__. Evidence is inadmissible "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. Although the State argues at SB 32, n.6 
that factors for determining unfair prejudice in State v. Shickles have been 
"disavowed," our supreme court recently clarified that "to the extent" that this 
Court "finds it helpful to consider a factor set forth in Shickles – or any other 
factor – it may do so." Ring, 2018 UT 19, ¶23; see Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 
(Utah 1988) (abrogated on other grounds, State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 
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1997)). As Mr. Bowden argued in the Opening Brief, considering evidence 
according to the Shickles factors2  indicates that the danger of unfair prejudice 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence. See OB 37-39. 
Evidence of the unfired Federal bullet was unfairly prejudicial. While 
"relevance is a low bar," it was irrelevant that Mr. Bowden had an unfired Federal 
cartridge in his pocket. See Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 61; OB 31-35; supra. The 
evidence improperly invited unwarranted speculation concerning Mr. Bowden's 
proclivities, interests, and skill with firearms. See OB 35-39. Thus, its "probative 
value" was easily outweighed by the "danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . ." See 
Utah R. Evid. 403; OB 35-39.  
B. Rule 404(b) is not a proper alternative ground for affirmance. 
The State argues that this Court can affirm "on any basis apparent in the 
record" and urges this Court to determine that evidence of the Federal bullet was 
admissible under rule 404(b). SB 29 n.5. But, 404(b) does not provide alternate 
grounds for affirmance where rules 402 and 403 limit 404(b) admissibility.  
Moreover, alternate grounds are not supported by the trial court findings or 
evidence in the record. 
                                                 
2 As the State points out, "overmastering hostility" is no longer an appropriate 
consideration. See SB 32 n.6; State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 20, 367 P.3d 981. 
Therefore, Mr. Bowden's possessing the unfired bullet did not need to meet the 
requirement of causing "overmastering hostility," but was unfairly prejudicial 
because it allowed the jury to speculate about a personal interest in firearms from 
what was otherwise mere access. See OB 38-39. 
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Rule 404(b) cannot provide alternate grounds for affirmance because rules 
402 and 403 limit the admissibility of evidence under 404(b). Evidence is 
admissible under rule 404(b) only if it meets three requirements. State v. 
Balfour, 2018 UT App 79,¶ 28, 418 P.3d 79. First, it must be "offered for a proper, 
noncharacter purpose." Id., (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ¶ 
18, 6 P.3d 1120) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Second, the court must 
determine whether the bad acts evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, 
which permits admission of only relevant evidence." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). "Finally, the trial court must determine whether the bad acts 
evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Thus, evidence that is inadmissible under rules 402 and 403, as is the 
case here, is also inadmissible despite rule 404(b).  
Moreover, the record reflects no evidence or trial court findings of fact that 
would justify admitting the evidence on 404(b) grounds. "[T]he 'affirm on any 
ground' rule of appellate review . . . is a tool available only in limited 
circumstances." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 13 n.3, 52 P.3d 1158. Even 
"[w]hen an alternative theory is apparent on the record, the court of appeals must 
then determine whether the facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to 
sustain the decision of the trial court on the alternate ground." Id. ¶ 20. In 
determining whether the alternate theory is factually sustainable, this Court "is 
limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and may not find new facts 
or reweigh the evidence in light of the new legal theory or alternate ground." Id. 
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Findings of fact by the trial court "were not required where the facts were 
'undisputed' and 'unequivocally reveal[ed]' the grounds supporting the alternate 
theory." Richardson v. Hart, 2009 UT App 387, ¶ 14, 223 P.3d 484 (quoting 
Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, ¶¶ 14-15, 114 P.3d 580).  
Here, the State proposes an alternate ground for affirmance that rests on 
disputed evidence. The State argues as facts to support its theory that police 
arrested Mr. Bowden twenty-two minutes after the shooting and that "various 
calibers of the same brand of ammunition were found in the truck Defendant 
stole."3 SB 30-31. Then, because the truck was full of guns and ammunition, the 
State argues that this proved Mr. Bowden's access to and familiarity with guns, 
thereby providing "further proof of his identity as the shooter." SB 31.  
Affirming on this alternate ground would require this Court to "assume the 
role of weighing evidence and making its own findings of fact," because the trial 
court made no factual findings. See Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ¶20; R.964. To affirm on 
that alternate ground would "exceed[] [the] proper role" of this Court, and 
require this Court to weigh evidence on factually "[]disputed" matters that are not 
"unequivocally reveal[ed]'" by the record. See Richardson, 2009 UT App 387, ¶ 
14. Factually disputed matters include, for example, who stole the truck, Mr. 
Bowden's intentions concerning the truck and its contents, who else had access to 
the truck, and whether Mr. Bowden had personal familiarity with firearms (as 
                                                 
3 See supra, Clarification of Facts, where Mr. Bowden explained the lack of trial 
evidence support the State's claim that jurors heard testimony that Mr. Bowden stole the 
truck, guns, and ammunition.  
19 
 
opposed to mere access). See id.; Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 22; SB 31; OB 34; 
Clarification of Facts, supra.  
This Court should decline the State's invitation to affirm on the alternate 
ground of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b).  
C. Without the evidence of the unfired bullet, there was a reasonable 
likelihood of better outcome for Mr. Bowden.  
    
 The State argues that "[g]iven the totality of the evidence the admission of 
the bullet did not create a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome." SB 
32-33. The State then recounts the evidence4, that it argues supports the verdicts. 
SB 33-34. The State does not contest that it discussed the unfired bullet evidence 
in closing argument at trial. See SB 32-34; OB 39-40. The State does not contest 
that admission of the evidence of the unfired cartridge allowed the jury to 
speculate as to Mr. Bowden's familiarity and competence with firearms. See SB 
32-34; OB 40-41. Much of the admissible evidence that the State points to, such 
as the dispatch recording, photographs of bullet casings, guns, ammunition, and 
bullet-holes, was not relevant to the identity of the shooter. See supra, Points 
II.A. and II.B.; OB 30-39; SB 33-34. Where the evidence presented to establish 
the shooter's identity was weak, irrelevant evidence that allowed the jury to 
speculate as to Mr. Bowden's familiarity and competence with firearms was 
prejudicial. See supra, Points I, II.A. and II.B.; OB 13-41. Without the irrelevant 
                                                 
4 See supra, Clarification of Facts, where Mr. Bowden explained the lack of trial 
evidence supporting the State's claim that jurors heard testimony that Mr. 
Bowden stole the truck, guns, and ammunition. See SB 33.  
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and unfairly prejudicial evidence, Mr. Bowden had a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome. 
III. The trial court erred in failing to merge Mr. Bowden's 
convictions for felony discharge of a firearm because merger 
was available and appropriate here. 
 
Mr. Bowden argued that his convictions for felony discharge of a firearm 
should merge because each conviction involved a single act and each discharge 
was necessarily proven by the evidence used to prove attempted aggravated 
murder. OB 44-55. The State does not challenge that each discharge was 
necessarily proven by the same or less evidence than that used to prove 
attempted aggravated murder. SB 35-37. Instead, the State argues that the 
aggravated murder statute explicitly prohibits merging felony discharge of a 
firearm with attempted aggravated murder. SB 35-37. The State's argument fails 
because the plain language of the aggravated murder statue does not prohibit 
felony discharge of a firearm from merging with attempted aggravated murder 
unless the discharge is a prior conviction used to enhance the murder. See Utah 
Code § 76-5-202, attached as Addendum B.  
The aggravated murder statute's plain language precludes merger only of 
"previous" convictions for felony discharge of a firearm, specifically when they 
constitute the circumstances aggravating the charged offense. Utah Code § 76-5-
202. Statutory plain language dictates whether criminal offenses merge. State v. 
Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶ 22, __ P.3d __. "[T]he legislature exempts a statute from 
the requirements of the merger doctrine only when 'an explicit indication of 
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legislative intent is present in the specific offense statute.'" State v. Bond, 2015 
UT 88, ¶ 70, 361 P.3d 104. Moreover, any statutory ambiguity should be resolved 
"in favor of lenity toward the person charged with criminal wrongdoing." See 
State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 22, 356 P.3d 1258. "Thus, . . . 'doubt [must] be 
resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses." Id., (quoting 
Bell v. U.S., 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955)).  
The statutory plain language does not preclude merger. The statute says: 
"Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes 
a separate offense does not merge with the crime of aggravated murder." Utah 
Code § 76-5-202(5)(a). "A person who is convicted of aggravated murder, based 
on an aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes 
a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and punished for, the separate 
offense." Utah Code § 76-5-202(5)(b). Aggravating circumstances may include 
that "the actor was previously convicted of . . ."felony discharge of a firearm." 
Utah Code § 76-5-202(1)(j)(xvii). "Previously" means "before the present time or 
the time referred to." Cambridge Dictionary, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/previously (last visited 
June 8, 2018). Thus, felony discharge of a firearm is only "an aggravating 
circumstance described in Subsection (1)" if it refers to a previous conviction (i.e., 
a conviction for felony discharge of a firearm that happened before the instant 
charges). See §§ 76-5-202(5); 76-5-202(1)(j)(xvii); Cambridge Dictionary, supra.  
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Here, the statute does not preclude felony discharge of a firearm from 
merging with aggravated murder because the felony discharge is not an 
aggravating circumstance based on a previous conviction. See Utah Code §§ 76-5-
202(5)(a); 76-5-202(1)(j)(xvii). First, the felony discharge of a firearm 
convictions are not aggravating circumstances based on previous convictions 
because they did not happen "before . . . the time referred to" in the Information. 
See § 76-5-202(1)(j)(xvii); Cambridge Dictionary, supra; R.1-3,35-37. Second, 
Mr. Bowden was not previously convicted of felony discharge of a firearm. R.531-
533. Third, the State did not charge Mr. Bowden with having previously been 
convicted of felony discharge of a firearm. R.1-3,35-37. Mr. Bowden is not "[a] 
person convicted of [attempted] aggravated murder, based on" having been 
"previously convicted of: . . . felony discharge of a firearm." See Utah Code §§ 76-
5-202(5)(b); 76-2-202(1)(j)(xvii); R.1-3,35-37,531-533. Contrary to the State's 
argument, Mr. Bowden's convictions for felony firearm discharge are free to 
merge "because felony discharge of a firearm . . . is" not "listed as an aggravating 
circumstance in the aggravated murder statute." See SB 36.  
Contrary to the State's argument, this is not a case, as was Bond, where the 
legislature exempted from merger the conviction that the defendant sought to 
merge. See SB 36; Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶¶ 67-72. In Bond, the statute exempted 
aggravated kidnapping from merging with aggravated murder because 
aggravated kidnapping was the circumstance that enhanced the Bond defendant's 
conviction to aggravated murder. Id. ¶¶ 67-71. Unlike in Bond, the statute did not 
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exempt Mr. Bowden's felony discharge of a firearm convictions from merger 
because, as current charges and not previous convictions, they were not 
aggravating circumstances. See Utah Code §§ 76-5-202(5)(a); 76-5-
202(1)(j)(xvii); c.f., Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶¶  1, 66, 71; R.1-3,35-37.  
To the extent this Court finds any ambiguity in the aggravated murder 
statute, this Court should resolve such in favor of assuming the legislature 
intended that merger be available for aggravated murder cases involving 
discharge of a firearm where the discharge is not for a prior conviction 
aggravating circumstance. See Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 22; Utah Code § 76-5-
202(1)(j).  
Finally, because the aggravated murder statute does not exempt felony 
discharge of a firearm from merger and the State has not challenged that the 
same evidence proving the attempted aggravated murder also proved felony 
firearm discharge, this Court should assume that the trial court should have 
merged the felony firearm discharges into the attempted aggravated murder 
conviction. See Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, L.L.C., 2012 UT 17, 
¶¶ 19-20; State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 19, 345 P.3d 1226. Alternatively, for the 
reasons stated in the opening brief, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
refusal to merge the felony discharge of a firearm conviction.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons and for the reasons stated in Mr. Bowden’s opening 
brief, Mr. Bowden respectfully asks this Court to reverse and remand with an 
order to dismiss the attempted aggravated murder and obstruction of justice 
convictions. Second, Mr. Bowden asks this Court to reverse and remand for a new 
trial on all counts because of the admission of the irrelevant evidence. Finally, 
Mr. Bowden requests that this Court reverse the trial court's erroneous ruling on 
merger and remand for resentencing. 
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ADDENDUM A
Utah R. Evid. 401 
 
Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence 
 
Evidence is relevant if: 
 
 (a)   it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence; and 
 
 (b)   the fact is of consequence in determining the action. 
 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as 
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood 
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These 
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result 
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
Utah R. Evid. 402 
 
Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence 
  
Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: 
  
●      the United States Constitution; 
●      the Utah Constitution; 
●      a statute; or 
●      rules applicable in courts of this state. 
  
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 
  
Utah R. Evid. 403 
 
Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, 
Waste of Time, or Other Reasons 
 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as 
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood 
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These 
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result 
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for 
exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in 
Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that 
a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing 
with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 
1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 
1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
Utah R. Evid. 404  
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted 
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused 
offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim 
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, 
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Advisory Committee Note B Rule 404 is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404 
verbatim. The 2001 amendments add the notice provisions already in the federal 
rule, add the amendments made to the federal rule effective December 1, 2000, 
and delete language added to the Utah Rule 404(b) in 1998. However, the 
deletion of that language is not intended to reinstate the holding of State v. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 






Utah Code § 76-5-202 (2015) 
§ 76-5-202. Aggravated murder 
 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances: 
(a) the homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or other 
correctional institution; 
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or 
criminal episode during which two or more persons were killed, or during which the 
actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the victim who was killed; 
(c) the actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim 
and the actor; 
(d) the homicide was committed incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or 
criminal episode during which the actor committed or attempted to commit 
aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a child, 
forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a child, 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, child abuse as defined in Subsection 
76-5-109(2)(a), or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated 
burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, or child kidnapping; 
(e) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or 
criminal episode during which the actor committed the crime of abuse or desecration 
of a dead human body as defined in Subsection 76-9-704(2)(e); 
(f) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of 
the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under color of legal authority or for 
the purpose of effecting the defendant’s or another’s escape from lawful custody; 
(g) the homicide was committed for pecuniary gain; 
(h) the defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person to commit the 
homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of 
remuneration for commission of the homicide; 
(i) the actor previously committed or was convicted of: 
(i) aggravated murder under this section; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder under this section; 
(iii) murder, Section 76-5-203; 
(iv) attempted murder, Section 76-5-203; or 
(v) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this state 
would be a violation of a crime listed in this Subsection (1)(i); 
(j) the actor was previously convicted of: 
(i) aggravated assault, Subsection 76-5-103(2); 
(ii) mayhem, Section 76-5-105; 
(iii) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301; 
(iv) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; 
(v) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302; 
 
 
(vi) rape, Section 76-5-402; 
(vii) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1; 
(viii) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2; 
(ix) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; 
(x) forcible sodomy, Section 76-5-403; 
(xi) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; 
(xii) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1; 
(xiii) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405; 
(xiv) aggravated arson, Section 76-6-103; 
(xv) aggravated burglary, Section 76-6-203; 
(xvi) aggravated robbery, Section 76-6-302; 
(xvii) felony discharge of a firearm, Section 76-10-508.1; or 
(xviii) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this state 
would be a violation of a crime listed in this Subsection (1)(j); 
(k) the homicide was committed for the purpose of: 
(i) preventing a witness from testifying; 
(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or participating in any legal 
proceedings or official investigation; 
(iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or participating 
in any legal proceedings or official investigation; or 
(iv) disrupting or hindering any lawful governmental function or enforcement of 
laws; 
(l) the victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a candidate for 
public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official 
position, act, capacity, or candidacy; 
(m) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer, executive 
officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter, judge or other court 
official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and the victim is either on duty or 
the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position, and the 
actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim holds or has held that 
official position; 
(n) the homicide was committed: 
(i) by means of a destructive device, bomb, explosive, incendiary device, or similar 
device which was planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, 
building, or structure, or was mailed or delivered; or 
(ii) by means of any weapon of mass destruction as defined in Section 76-10-401; 
(o) the homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assuming control of any 
aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of threats or force with intent to 
obtain any valuable consideration for the release of the public conveyance or any 
passenger, crew member, or any other person aboard, or to direct the route or 
movement of the public conveyance or otherwise exert control over the public 
conveyance; 
(p) the homicide was committed by means of the administration of a poison or of any 
lethal substance or of any substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or 
quantity; 




(r) the homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or 
exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical 
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before death; 
(s) the actor dismembers, mutilates, or disfigures the victim’s body, whether before or 
after death, in a manner demonstrating the actor’s depravity of mind; or 
(t) the victim, at the time of the death of the victim: 
(i) was younger than 14 years of age; and 
(ii) was not an unborn child. 
 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor, with reckless 
indifference to human life, causes the death of another incident to an act, scheme, 
course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor is a major participant in 
the commission or attempted commission of: 
(a) child abuse, Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a); 
(b) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; 
(c) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1; 
(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; 
(e) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; or 
(f) sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1. 
 
(3)(a) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been filed, aggravated murder is 
a capital felony. 
(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has not been filed, aggravated 
murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable as provided in Section 
76-3-207.7. 
(c)(i) Within 60 days after arraignment of the defendant, the prosecutor may file 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The notice shall be served on the defendant 
or defense counsel and filed with the court. 
(ii) Notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be served and filed more than 60 
days after the arraignment upon written stipulation of the parties or upon a finding 
by the court of good cause. 
(d) Without the consent of the prosecutor, the court may not accept a plea of guilty to 
noncapital first degree felony aggravated murder during the period in which the 
prosecutor may file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty under Subsection 
(3)(c)(i). 
(e) If the defendant was younger than 18 years of age at the time the offense was 
committed, aggravated murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable as 
provided in Section 76-3-207.7. 
 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated murder or attempted 
aggravated murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to 
cause the death of another under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a 
legal justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct was not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a) shall be determined 
 
 
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
(c) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) aggravated murder to murder; and 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder to attempted murder. 
(5)(a) Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes a 
separate offense does not merge with the crime of aggravated murder. 
 
(b) A person who is convicted of aggravated murder, based on an aggravating 
circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes a separate offense, 
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